Preface |
|
iii | |
|
|
ix | |
|
|
xi | |
Summary |
|
xiii | |
Acknowledgments |
|
xix | |
Acronyms |
|
xxi | |
|
|
1 | (6) |
|
|
1 | (1) |
|
|
1 | (5) |
|
A New Movement Stressing EBO |
|
|
1 | (1) |
|
A Way of Viewing the EBO Movement |
|
|
2 | (3) |
|
Opportuty and a Grand Challenge |
|
|
5 | (1) |
|
Organization of This Monograph |
|
|
6 | (1) |
|
Definitions, Dimensions, and Distinctions |
|
|
7 | (14) |
|
|
7 | (10) |
|
|
7 | (1) |
|
Issues of Scope Implied by the Definition |
|
|
8 | (3) |
|
EBO as Expansion Rather than Substitution |
|
|
11 | (3) |
|
Definitions Need to Work for Both Sides |
|
|
14 | (1) |
|
Allowing Also for Virtual Wars |
|
|
15 | (1) |
|
|
15 | (2) |
|
A Simple Taxonomy and Some Examples of EBO |
|
|
17 | (4) |
|
|
17 | (1) |
|
|
18 | (1) |
|
|
18 | (3) |
|
Challenges in Addressing EBO |
|
|
21 | (8) |
|
|
21 | (3) |
|
Strategic Misjudgments Related to Understanding and Influencing Adversaries |
|
|
21 | (3) |
|
Operational-Level Experiences: An EBO Scorecard for the Gulf War |
|
|
24 | (1) |
|
Why EBO Is Difficult: It's the CAS Effect, Stupid! |
|
|
24 | (5) |
|
|
26 | (1) |
|
|
26 | (3) |
|
Suggested Principles for Analysis in the Context of EBO |
|
|
29 | (20) |
|
|
29 | (1) |
|
|
30 | (5) |
|
|
30 | (3) |
|
|
33 | (1) |
|
|
34 | (1) |
|
Highlighting the System Aspects |
|
|
35 | (1) |
|
Exploratory Analysis to Confront Uncertainty |
|
|
35 | (3) |
|
|
35 | (1) |
|
Using a Family of Models and Games |
|
|
35 | (2) |
|
The Need to Address probabilities |
|
|
37 | (1) |
|
Discussing Probabilistic Matters Simply |
|
|
38 | (1) |
|
|
38 | (8) |
|
|
38 | (4) |
|
Adding Sophistication: Situational Dependence and Time Dependence |
|
|
42 | (1) |
|
|
43 | (3) |
|
Pursuit of Empirical Information |
|
|
46 | (1) |
|
Structuring Models Around Command and Control |
|
|
46 | (3) |
|
Examples of How EBO Can be Represented Analytically |
|
|
49 | (30) |
|
A Baseline Problem and Analysis |
|
|
49 | (6) |
|
The Baseline Halt Problem |
|
|
49 | (3) |
|
An Innovative Operational Concept |
|
|
52 | (1) |
|
|
53 | (2) |
|
Rethinking from an Effects-Based Perspective |
|
|
55 | (12) |
|
Questioning the Assumptions |
|
|
55 | (2) |
|
The Potential for Early Strikes Imposing Delays |
|
|
57 | (3) |
|
Defeating the Enemy Piecemeal |
|
|
60 | (1) |
|
Considering the Upside and the Downside |
|
|
61 | (1) |
|
The Non-Ideal Case: Thinking About Early Use of Ground Forces |
|
|
62 | (5) |
|
|
67 | (11) |
|
Some Speculations Based on History |
|
|
67 | (1) |
|
What Might a Qualitative Model Look Like? |
|
|
68 | (3) |
|
The Dimensions of a Fuller Theory |
|
|
71 | (2) |
|
Simplifying the Theory, if It Has Been Formulated |
|
|
73 | (2) |
|
A Cognitive Model of a Commander |
|
|
75 | (2) |
|
|
77 | (1) |
|
Distinctions Between Operations Planning and Defense Planning |
|
|
78 | (1) |
|
|
79 | (6) |
|
|
79 | (1) |
|
Principles for an Approach |
|
|
79 | (2) |
|
|
81 | (4) |
Bibliography |
|
85 | |