The Homevoter Hypothesis

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Format: Paperback
Pub. Date: 2005-02-15
Publisher(s): Harvard Univ Pr
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Summary

Just as investors want the companies they hold equity in to do well, homeowners have a financial interest in the success of their communities. If neighborhood schools are good, if property taxes and crime rates are low, then the value of the homeowner's principal asset--his home--will rise. Thus, as William Fischel shows, homeowners become watchful citizens of local government, not merely to improve their quality of life, but also to counteract the risk to their largest asset, a risk that cannot be diversified. Meanwhile, their vigilance promotes a municipal governance that provides services more efficiently than do the state or national government. Fischel has coined the portmanteau word "homevoter" to crystallize the connection between homeownership and political involvement. The link neatly explains several vexing puzzles, such as why displacement of local taxation by state funds reduces school quality and why local governments are more likely to be efficient providers of environmental amenities. The Homevoter Hypothesis thereby makes a strong case for decentralization of the fiscal and regulatory functions of government.

Author Biography

William A. Fischel is Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College.

Table of Contents

Preface
An Asset-Market Approach to Local Government
Local Government's Corporate Form
Capitalization, Zoning, and the Tiebout Hypothesis
The Median Voter in Local Government Politics
Serrano and the California Tax Revolt
The Fruits of School-Finance Centralization
The Race to the Top in Environmental Protection
""Beggar Thy Neighbor"" and Land fill Location
How Homevoters Remade Metropolitan Areas
Sprawl, Metropolitanism, and Local Control
Reforming and Reaffirming Local Go
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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