
Monopsony in Law and Economics
by Roger D. Blair , Jeffrey L. HarrisonBuy New
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Summary
Author Biography
Table of Contents
Preface | p. xiii |
Introduction | p. 1 |
Introduction | p. 1 |
Some Recent Examples | p. 2 |
Bid Rigging at Antique Auctions | p. 2 |
Information Sharing at Treasury Auctions | p. 3 |
American Express and the Boston Fee Party | p. 5 |
Collusion on Campus: Financial Aid | p. 6 |
Collusion in Baseball's Free Agent Market | p. 8 |
The Market for College Athletes and Coaches | p. 10 |
Monopsony and Agriculture | p. 11 |
Upheaval in Health Care Markets | p. 12 |
Plan of the Book | p. 14 |
The Antitrust Laws and Monopsonistic Forms of Conduct | p. 16 |
Introduction | p. 16 |
The Sherman Act | p. 17 |
Agreements in Restraint of Trade | p. 17 |
Monopolization and Attempts to Monopolize | p. 20 |
The Clayton Act | p. 22 |
Price Discrimination | p. 23 |
Tying and Exclusive Dealing | p. 24 |
Mergers | p. 27 |
A Taxonomy of Monopsony Cases | p. 29 |
Collusive Monopsony | p. 30 |
Single-Firm Conduct | p. 36 |
Mergers | p. 40 |
Concluding Remarks | p. 40 |
Economic Theory of Monopsony | p. 41 |
Introduction | p. 41 |
A Simple Model of Monopsony | p. 41 |
The Welfare Effects of Monopsony | p. 43 |
The Effect of Monopsony on Output Price | p. 45 |
Collusive Monopsony | p. 48 |
The Economics | p. 48 |
Conditions Conducive to Collusive Monopsony | p. 49 |
Organizing and Implementing a Buyer Cartel | p. 50 |
Problems for Collusive Buyers | p. 51 |
Measuring Buying Power | p. 53 |
The Measurement of Buying Power | p. 54 |
The Buying Power Index: Pure Monopsony | p. 54 |
The Buying Power Index: The Dominant Buyer | p. 55 |
The BPI and the Department of Justice Threshold | p. 60 |
Market Definition and the BPI | p. 61 |
The Buying Power Index in Practice | p. 64 |
Concluding Remarks | p. 67 |
The Antitrust Response to Monopsony and Collusive Monopsony | p. 68 |
Introduction | p. 68 |
Judicial Assessment of Market Power | p. 69 |
Monopsony Pricing | p. 70 |
Abuses of Monopsony Power | p. 78 |
Price Effects | p. 78 |
Classical Model | p. 78 |
Inelastic Supply and Perishable Commodities | p. 79 |
The Role of Perishability | p. 81 |
Welfare Consequences of Collusion in the Context of Inelastic Supply | p. 82 |
All-or-None Supply Cases | p. 83 |
Nonprice Abuses | p. 85 |
Horizontal Market Division | p. 85 |
Bid Rigging | p. 86 |
Refusals to Deal | p. 88 |
Monopsony Leverage and Tying | p. 91 |
Monopsony and Merger Policy | p. 93 |
Horizontal Mergers | p. 93 |
Vertical Mergers | p. 96 |
Monopsony and Price Discrimination | p. 99 |
Monopsony and Unexploited Scale Economies | p. 101 |
Different Supply Elasticities | p. 103 |
Concluding Remarks | p. 104 |
Cooperative Buying Efforts | p. 106 |
Introduction | p. 106 |
The Theory of Joint Purchasing | p. 107 |
Efficiency-Enhancing Cooperative Buying Ventures | p. 108 |
Enhanced Efficiency and Increased Buying Power | p. 109 |
Antitrust Responses to Cooperative Buying Efforts | p. 113 |
The Ancillary Restraints Doctrine | p. 113 |
Application of the Ancillary Restraints Doctrine to Efficiency-Producing Buying Agreements | p. 115 |
Cooperative Buying | p. 115 |
Product Standardization | p. 117 |
Northwest Wholesale Stationers and U.S. Department of Justice Guidelines | p. 119 |
A Structural Dilemma | p. 121 |
Concluding Remarks | p. 122 |
Bilateral Monopoly | p. 123 |
Introduction | p. 123 |
Countervailing Market Power in Antitrust | p. 124 |
The Bilateral Monopoly Muddle | p. 126 |
The Correct Solution | p. 127 |
A Simple Model of Bilateral Monopoly | p. 128 |
A Formula Price Contract Solution | p. 131 |
Difficulties with Vertical Integration | p. 131 |
Vertical Integration by Contract | p. 132 |
Formula Price Contracts | p. 133 |
Performance Characteristics | p. 134 |
Limitations of Countervailing Power Considerations | p. 136 |
Transaction Costs | p. 136 |
The Risk of Seller Collusion | p. 138 |
Oligopoly and Oligopsony | p. 140 |
Concluding Remarks | p. 141 |
Appendix: Price Determination in Bilateral Monopoly | p. 142 |
Monopsony and Antitrust Enforcement | p. 146 |
Introduction | p. 146 |
Private Enforcement | p. 146 |
Antitrust Injury | p. 150 |
Antitrust Standing | p. 152 |
Applying the Standards | p. 156 |
Collusive Monopsony | p. 157 |
Price Fixing | p. 157 |
Market Division | p. 162 |
Boycotts | p. 163 |
Monopsonization | p. 163 |
Nonprice Efforts | p. 163 |
Predatory Pricing | p. 164 |
Mergers | p. 166 |
Price Discrimination | p. 167 |
Concluding Remarks and Measuring Antitrust Damages | p. 168 |
Monopsony in Action: Agricultural Markets | p. 172 |
Introduction | p. 172 |
The Monopsony Problem | p. 173 |
Monopsony Power and Contract Power | p. 174 |
Tying and Reciprocal Dealing | p. 179 |
Alternative Approaches to Agricultural Buying Power | p. 182 |
Concluding Remarks | p. 187 |
Monopsony in Action: The NCAA | p. 188 |
Introduction | p. 188 |
Introduction to the NCAA | p. 188 |
Collusive Monopsony | p. 189 |
The NCAA and Collusive Monopsony | p. 190 |
Organizing Limits on Prices and Quantities | p. 191 |
Revenue Sharing | p. 194 |
Sanctions for Cheating | p. 194 |
Antitrust Challenges to the NCAA Monopsony | p. 196 |
Walk-on Athletes: In re NCAA I-A Walk-on Football Players Litigation | p. 197 |
Undercompensation: White v. NCAA | p. 198 |
Numbers of Coaches: Hennessey v. NCAA | p. 199 |
Coaches' Compensation: Law v. NCAA | p. 201 |
Concluding Remarks | p. 204 |
Monopsony in Action: Physician Collective Bargaining: Monopoly or Bilateral Monopoly | p. 205 |
Introduction | p. 205 |
Economic Rationale of the State Legislation | p. 207 |
The Effect of Cooperative Bargaining | p. 208 |
Reaction of the Federal Trade Commission | p. 208 |
Economic Rationale of FTC Concerns | p. 211 |
State Action Doctrine | p. 211 |
Background | p. 212 |
Clear Articulation | p. 212 |
Active State Supervision | p. 213 |
Information Available | p. 215 |
Diagnosing Monopsony Power | p. 215 |
Statutory Guidance | p. 216 |
Monopsony and Monopsony Power | p. 217 |
Analysis of the Relevant Product (or Service) Market | p. 217 |
Analysis of the Relevant Geographic Market | p. 218 |
Measuring Monopsony Power | p. 218 |
Importance of Entry Barriers | p. 220 |
Implications of the BPI | p. 220 |
Calculating Market Shares | p. 221 |
Postnegotiation Review | p. 222 |
Concluding Remarks | p. 222 |
Final Comments | p. 224 |
Introduction | p. 224 |
The Evolving Nature of Antitrust Law | p. 224 |
Issues of Antitrust Injury and Standing | p. 225 |
Cooperative Buying and Bilateral Monopoly | p. 228 |
The Pervasiveness of All-or-None Supply | p. 230 |
Single-Firm Behavior | p. 231 |
Bibliography | p. 233 |
Index | p. 245 |
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
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