
Strategic Leadership Theory and Research on Executives, Top Management Teams, and Boards
by Cannella, Bert; Finkelstein, Sydney; Hambrick, Donald C.Buy New
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Summary
Author Biography
Sydney Finkelstein is the Steven Roth Professor of Management at the Tuck School at Dartmouth College, where he teaches courses on Leadership, Top Management Teams, and Managing Mergers and Acquisitions. He is also Faculty Director of the flagship Tuck Executive Program, as well as a consultant for companies around the world. Professor Finkelstein has conducted extensive research on strategic leadership, published numerous articles in the major journals in his field, and has written ten books.
Donald C. Hambrick is the Smeal Chaired Professor of Management, Smeal College of Business Administration, at The Pennsylvania State University. He holds a PhD degree from The Pennsylvania State University. His research focuses primarily on the study of top executives and their effects on strategy and performance. An active consultant and executive education instructor, he also served as president of the Academy of Management.
Albert A. Cannella Jr. is Koerner Chair in Strategy and Entrepreneurship at Tulane University. He received his Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1991. He serves on the editorial review boards of Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, Administrative Science Quarterly, and Strategic Management Journal. His research interests focus on executives, entrepreneurship, and competitive dynamics.
Table of Contents
The Study of Top Executives | p. 3 |
The Essence of Strategic Leadership | p. 4 |
Academic Attention to Executives: A Historical View | p. 6 |
The Scope of Strategic Leadership | p. 9 |
Chief Executive Officers | p. 9 |
Business Unit Heads | p. 10 |
Top Management Teams | p. 10 |
Boards of Directors | p. 11 |
Additional Matters of Scope | p. 11 |
Overview of the Book | p. 12 |
Do Top Executives Matter? | p. 16 |
What Do Top Executives Do? | p. 17 |
Basic Dimensions of the Job | p. 19 |
Do Managers Matter? A Doubtful View | p. 20 |
Do Managers Matter? A Positive View | p. 22 |
Problems with Lieberson and O'Connor's Study | p. 23 |
Evidence of Executive Effects | p. 24 |
Managerial Discretion | p. 26 |
Environmental Sources | p. 27 |
Organizational Sources | p. 31 |
Individual Sources | p. 33 |
Effects of Discretion | p. 34 |
Executive Job Demands | p. 37 |
The Managerial Mystique | p. 38 |
Conclusion | p. 40 |
How Individual Differences Affect Executive Action | p. 43 |
A Model of Human Limits on Strategic Choice | p. 44 |
The Filtering Process | p. 46 |
Executive Orientation: An Overview | p. 49 |
Psychological Characteristics as Bases for Executive Action | p. 51 |
Executive Values | p. 52 |
Cognitive Model | p. 59 |
Executive Personality | p. 70 |
Positive Self-Regard | p. 76 |
Conclusion | p. 82 |
Executive Experiences and Organizational Outcomes | p. 83 |
Executive Tenure | p. 85 |
Tenure and Executive Psychology | p. 85 |
Tenure and Organizational Strategy | p. 90 |
Tenure and Performance | p. 93 |
Functional Background | p. 97 |
Functional Experiences and Executive Perceptions | p. 97 |
Links to Strategy and Performance | p. 101 |
Future Research on Functional Experiences | p. 104 |
Formal Education | p. 106 |
International Experience | p. 112 |
Future Directions | p. 113 |
Promising Avenues of Research | p. 114 |
A Still-Untapped Perspective: The Factors Affecting the Predictive Strength of Executive Characteristics | p. 116 |
Which Traits? | p. 117 |
Which Behaviors? | p. 118 |
Which People? | p. 119 |
Which Situations? | p. 119 |
Conclusion | p. 120 |
Top Management Teams | p. 121 |
The Conceptual Elements of Top Management Teams | p. 123 |
How the Conceptual Elements of TMTs Are Related | p. 125 |
Teams versus Groups | p. 126 |
Who Is in the Top Group? | p. 127 |
Power Dynamics at the Top | p. 128 |
Interactions within TMTs | p. 131 |
The CEO and Team Process | p. 137 |
Determinants of TMT Characteristics | p. 138 |
Environment | p. 138 |
Organization | p. 142 |
CEO | p. 148 |
Consequences of TMTs' Interaction | p. 152 |
Consequences of TMTs on Strategic Decision Making | p. 152 |
Consequences of TMTs on Strategy | p. 154 |
Consequences of TMTs on Firm Performance | p. 158 |
Conclusion | p. 162 |
Changes at the Top: The Antecedents of Executive Turnover and Succession | p. 164 |
Will Succession Occur? Determinants of Top Executive Departure | p. 166 |
Organizational Performance | p. 168 |
Agency Conditions | p. 171 |
Other Organizational Characteristics | p. 174 |
Environment | p. 176 |
Predecessor (Incumbent) Characteristics | p. 178 |
What Will Be the Dynamics of the Succession Process? | p. 179 |
Types of Successions | p. 179 |
Influence of the Incumbent versus the Board | p. 183 |
Who Will Be Selected? | p. 185 |
Insider versus Outsider Selection | p. 186 |
The Broader Case of Continuity versus Change | p. 194 |
Conclusion | p. 196 |
Changes at the Top: The Consequences of Executive Turnover and Succession | p. 198 |
What Are the Consequences of Succession? | p. 199 |
The New Executive's Behaviors and Organizational Change | p. 200 |
Implications for Organizational Performance | p. 204 |
Executive Turnover: Beyond the CEO | p. 213 |
Other Interesting Issues for Succession | p. 224 |
Conclusion | p. 225 |
Understanding Board Structure, Composition, and Vigilance | p. 227 |
Determinants of Board Structure and Composition | p. 229 |
What Do We Mean by Board Structure and Composition? | p. 229 |
Critical Contingencies | p. 232 |
Institutional Forces | p. 234 |
Agency Conditions | p. 238 |
Determinants of Board Vigilance | p. 243 |
Board Vigilance in Monitoring and Disciplining Top Management | p. 243 |
Competition versus Cooperation in Board-CEO Relations | p. 251 |
Conclusion | p. 253 |
The Consequences of Board Involvement and Vigilance | p. 255 |
Board Involvement in Strategy Formation | p. 255 |
Contextual Conditions Predicting Board Strategic Involvement | p. 263 |
Boards and Firm Performance | p. 269 |
Board Effects on Strategy | p. 270 |
Boards as Supra-Top Management Teams | p. 277 |
Board Monitoring and Disciplinary Behavior | p. 281 |
Boards and Executive Compensation | p. 282 |
Boards and Monitoring Behaviors | p. 284 |
Conclusion | p. 289 |
The Determinants of Executive Compensation | p. 291 |
Organizing Dimensions for a Framework of Executive Compensation | p. 291 |
Direction of Causality | p. 291 |
Theoretical Perspectives | p. 292 |
Unit of Analysis | p. 293 |
Economic Explanations for Executive Compensation | p. 295 |
Research from the Managerialist and Neoclassical Traditions | p. 295 |
Moderators of the Pay-Performance Relationship | p. 296 |
Human Capital | p. 305 |
Marginal Product and the Managerial Labor Market | p. 309 |
Social Explanations for Executive Compensation | p. 310 |
Ismorphism of Executive Compensation | p. 312 |
Social Comparison Processes in the Setting of Executive Pay | p. 315 |
Social Capital | p. 318 |
Political Explanations for Executive Compensation | p. 320 |
Compensation for Business Unit General Managers: Determinants and Consequences | p. 324 |
GM Compensation versus CEO Compensation | p. 324 |
The Determinants of GM Compensation | p. 325 |
The Consequences of GM Compensation | p. 327 |
Conclusion | p. 328 |
Executive Compensation: Consequences and Distributions | p. 330 |
Consequences of Executive Compensation | p. 330 |
Economic Explanations for the Consequences of Executive Compensation | p. 331 |
Behavioral Agency Theory | p. 337 |
Social Explanations for the Consequences of Executive Compensation | p. 344 |
Political Explanations for the Consequences of Executive Compensation | p. 346 |
Distribution of Compensation within Top Management Teams | p. 348 |
Pay Differential between CEOs and Other Executives in the Firm | p. 348 |
Pay Dispersion within Top Management Teams | p. 356 |
TMT and CEO Compensation Patterns | p. 361 |
Conclusion | p. 364 |
Notes | p. 367 |
References | p. 383 |
Index | p. 451 |
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