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List of Tables and Figures |
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ix | |
Acknowledgments |
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xiii | |
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1 | (16) |
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1 | (3) |
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4 | (6) |
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10 | (7) |
PART I Models of Voter Behavior |
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17 | (90) |
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Alternative Models of Issue Voting |
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19 | (19) |
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19 | (4) |
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The Downsian Proximity Model |
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19 | (3) |
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The Grofman Discounting Model |
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22 | (1) |
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23 | (9) |
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The Matthews Directional Model |
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25 | (4) |
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The Rabinowitz-Macdonald Directional Model |
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29 | (3) |
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32 | (6) |
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A Unified Model of Issue Voting: Proximity, Direction, and Intensity |
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38 | (14) |
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Limitations of Pure Models |
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38 | (2) |
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40 | (7) |
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Relation between the Grofman Discounting Model and the RM Model with Proximity Constraint |
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47 | (3) |
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50 | (2) |
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Comparing the Empirical Fit of the Directional and Proximity Models for Voter Utility Functions |
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52 | (15) |
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Discriminating between Models |
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52 | (1) |
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53 | (6) |
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Correlation and Regression Analyses of Pure Models of Voter Utility |
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59 | (7) |
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60 | (4) |
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64 | (2) |
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66 | (1) |
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Empirical Model Fitting Using the Unified Model: Voter Utility |
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67 | (14) |
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Testing the Proximity and Directional Models of Voter Utility within a Nested Statistical Framework |
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67 | (1) |
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68 | (2) |
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Fitting the Unified Model of Voter Utility via Nonlinear Regression |
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70 | (4) |
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Parameter Estimates for the Mixed Proximity-RM Model |
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74 | (4) |
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78 | (3) |
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Empirical Fitting of Probabilistic Models of Voter Choice in Two-Party Electorates |
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81 | (10) |
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81 | (1) |
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A Unified Model of Voter Choice |
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82 | (2) |
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Fitting the Conditional Logit Model to American NES Data |
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84 | (5) |
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89 | (2) |
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Empirical Fitting of Probabilistic Models of Voter Choice in Multiparty Electorates |
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91 | (16) |
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91 | (1) |
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Mixed Deterministic and Probabilistic Models |
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92 | (3) |
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Fitting the Conditional Logit Model to Norwegian Data |
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95 | (8) |
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Fitting the Conditional Logit Model to French Data |
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103 | (2) |
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Discussion and Conclusions |
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105 | (2) |
PART II Models of Party or Candidate Behavior and Strategy |
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107 | (57) |
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Equilibrium Strategies for Two-Candidate Directional Spatial Models |
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109 | (19) |
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109 | (1) |
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Nash Equilibrium under the Grofman Discounting Model and Constrained Directional Models |
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110 | (4) |
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Nash Equilibria under the Matthews Directional Model |
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114 | (9) |
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Characterization of Condorcet Directional Vectors in Two Dimensions |
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115 | (5) |
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The Condorcet Vacuum for American and Norwegian Data |
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120 | (3) |
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Strategies when Different Models Govern Each Candidate |
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123 | (4) |
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127 | (1) |
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Long-term Dynamics of Voter Choice and Party Strategy |
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128 | (16) |
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Why Is There Limited Polarization and Alternation of Parties? |
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128 | (3) |
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Base Dynamic Model under Discounting |
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131 | (2) |
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Convergence to Separate Points of Stability for Each Party under the Base Model |
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133 | (2) |
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Party Strategy under Discounting |
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135 | (3) |
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Modifications of the Model for Asymmetric Parties and Disparate Discount Factors |
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138 | (3) |
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141 | (3) |
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Strategy and Equilibria in Multicandidate Elections |
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144 | (14) |
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Multicandidate Equilibria |
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144 | (1) |
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A Multidimensional Convergent Equilibrium |
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145 | (3) |
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Divergent Equilibria with Partisan Voting and the Effect of a Directional Component |
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148 | (3) |
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Regions of Candidate Support for Directional Models for More than Two Candidates |
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151 | (5) |
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Discussion and Conclusions |
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156 | (2) |
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Strategy under Alternative Multicandidate Voting Procedures |
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158 | (6) |
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Alternative Voting Procedures |
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158 | (2) |
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Are Centrists or Extremists Favored? |
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160 | (1) |
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161 | (1) |
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162 | (2) |
Postscript Taking Stock of What's Been Done and What Still Needs to Be Done |
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164 | (6) |
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166 | (4) |
Appendices |
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170 | (25) |
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3.1 Mixed Proximity-RM Models |
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170 | (2) |
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4.1 Methodology: Data Analysis |
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172 | (1) |
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4.2 Methodology: Linear versus Quadratic Utility Functions |
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173 | (1) |
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4.3Methodology: Mean versus Voter-specific Placements of Candidates |
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174 | (5) |
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5.1 The Nature and Magnitude of Projection Effects |
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179 | (2) |
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5.2 Interpretation of Model Parameters |
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181 | (1) |
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5.3 The Westholm Adjustment for Interpersonal Comparisons |
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181 | (5) |
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7.1 Methodology: The Lewis and King Critique |
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186 | (3) |
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7.2 Methodology: English Translations of Questions from the Norwegian Election Studies |
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189 | (1) |
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7.3 A Strategic Probabilistic Model of Voter Choice |
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189 | (2) |
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8.1 Notes on Equilibrium Analysis |
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191 | (2) |
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8.2 Use of Harmonic Decomposition to Determine Equilibria |
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193 | (2) |
Glossary of Symbols |
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195 | (1) |
References |
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196 | (11) |
Index |
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207 | |